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COMMENTS
INSURANCE - BREACH OF THE NOTICE
CONDITION IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY POLICIES*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the terms of a typical automobile liability insurance policy a policyholder is required to provide his insurer
with prompt notice of any accident and immediate notice of
any claim or suit as a condition of the company's obligation to
defend and indemnify its insured against financial loss., All
auto liability policies require compliance with the "notice"
clause as a condition precedent to any action against the insurer to enforce the insuring agreements.2 The notice clause

itself has been generally recognized as a valid stipulation in
the policy ;3 the purpose of which has been "to enable the in-

surer to inform itself promptly concerning the accident, to in*Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d 727
(1971).
1. The typical clause contained inthese policies may be illustrated by the
following language quoted in Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 256 S.C.
376, 379, 182 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1971) :
When an accident occurs written notice shall be given by or on
behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized
agents as soon as practicable. Such notice shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place and circumstances
of the accident, the names and addresses of the injured and of
available witnesses.
If claim is made or suit is brought against the insured, the insured shall immediately forward to the company every demand,
notice, summons or other process received by him or his representative.
Although there are minor variations among clauses appearing in the policies
written by the many companies in this field, the clause reproduced above contains the standard basic requirements.
2. Again referring to the policy quoted in n. 1, supra, "No action shall lie
against the company, unless as a condition precedent thereto, the insured shall
have complied with all the terms of this policy, ..."
3. See, generally, Annot. 18 A.L.R. 2d 443, 450 (1951).
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vestigate the circumstances and prepare a timely defense, if
'4
necessary, on behalf of the insured."

Difficulties have arisen, however, in the interpretation of
the notice clause by the courts. Extensive litigation has resulted, interpreting practically every significant term and subclause within the provision. 5 In addition the courts have been
called upon to balance the effects of non-compliance with the
notice provision against the effect of leaving a policyholder or
third party claimant with damages for which he has no satisfactory remedy. In balancing the various competing interests,

in the interpretation of policies generally, the courts have
given weight to many considerations ranging from the tradi-

tional concept of contract law which regards the plain language of the policy as binding on the parties, to the more recently developed rationale which would give more weight to
public policy, 6 with particular focus on the policy of most

legislatures in requiring automobile liability insurance or an
equivalent personal financial responsibility.7 In the recent
case of Factory Mutual Liability Insura/nce Company v. Ken-

nedy, s the South Carolina Supreme Court, in considering an
alleged breach of the notice provisions of an automobile liabil4. Washington v. Nat'l. Serv. Fire Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 635, 641, 168 S.E.2d

90, 93 (1969).
5. See, Annot. 76 A.L.R. 23 (1932); Annot. 123 A.L.R. 952 (1939) and
Annot. 18 A.L.R. 2d 442 (1951) for collected cases.
6. In reviewing the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court we
find no exception to the general statement. In Walker v. Commercial Cas. Ins.
Co., 191 S.C. 187, 191, 4 S.E.2d 248, 249 (1939) the court stated, "[Wihen
such contracts are capable of clear interpretation the court's duty is confined
to the enforcement thereof; it cannot exercise its discretion as to the wisdom
of such contract or substitute its own for that which was agreed upon." (citation omitted). And in Stanky v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 533, 538, 121 S.E.2d
10, 13 (1961), the court stated, "We cannot read into insurance contracts, under
the guise of public policy, provisions which are not required by law and which
the parties thereto clearly and plainly have failed to include. See also, Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); S.S. Newell & Co. v.
Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 199 S.C. 325, 19 S.E.2d 423 (1942); and, Sauls v.
Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 193 S.C. 289, 8 S.E.2d 500 (1940). The public
policy argument was given weight in Evans v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 252
S.C. 417, 166 S.E.2d 811 (1969) and, more particularly, in other cases when a
breach of the cooperation condition was involved.
7. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§46-701-705.54 (1962) and GA. CODE ANN. §92A-605 (Supp. 1971).
8. 256 S.C. 376, 182 S.E.2d 727 (1971).
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ity policy, found the public policy of protecting innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents to be a decisive factor.9
On February 18, 1966, Albert Kennedy, an insured under
the Factory Mutual policy issued to his wife, was involved in
a collision with Norman and Myrnai Barkoot. On February
25, 1966, Kennedy was served with a Summons (Complaint
not served). On March 23, 1966, Kennedy was served with the

Complaint. No answer or other pleading was served on Barkoot's counsel, resulting in a default judgment being entered

against Kennedy in the Richland County Court of Common
Pleas on May 12, 1966. Though the testimony before the mas-

ter was in conflict, it was decided as a matter of fact that Factory Mutual received no notice of the collision until July 29,
1967.10 On May 31, 1968, an order was entered opening the
default, under which Factory Mutual filed an answer, reserving its right to contest the applicability of the policy." Factory Mutual then filed for a declaratory judgment asking the
court below to find that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify Kennedy in the civil action by virtue of his failure to
12
comply with the notice provisions of the policy in question.

Along with Kennedy, his wife and the Barkoots, Factory Mutual named Fireman's Fund American Insurance Company,

the uninsured motorist carrier for the Barkoots, as a defendant.' 3
9. Id. at 381, 182 S.E.2d at 729.
10. Record at 71.
11. Record at 72.
12. Record at 3-7.
13. In retrospect, a question is raised on the advisibility of adding Fireman's Fund as a defendant in the case. The question is not clearly answered
in this state. S.C. Code Ann. §10-2008 (1962)

provides that ".

.

. all persons

shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding. . .

."

It is clear that the Barkoots were necessary

parties under the authority of Plrr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d
394 (1958). But whether Fireman's Fund could be considered as such a party
has not been ruled on. It would seem that Fireman's Fund's obligation, if any,
would have depended solely upon whether they owed the Barkoots under a
separate policy, not involved in the litigation, which obligation would only become a right upon payment and under the subrogation provisions of its policy.
Since the Barkoots did not appeal the ruling below, Fireman's Fund's complaint would have been with the failure of the Barkoots to appeal rather than
the result of the litigation in the Court of Common Pleas. This writer recognizes the mootness of the point in respects of this case and further that sub-
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The Master found, inter alia, that an unreasonable delay
in giving notice of an accident or in forwarding suit papers
was sufficient, irrespective of prejudice to the insurer, to relieve the insurer of its obligation to defend and indemnify its
policyholder. 14 This ruling was appealed and, thus presented
the court with its first opportunity' 5 to resolve whether prejudice to the insurer was to be a prerequisite to the avoidance
of the obligations imposed by the policy when (A) there has
been an alleged breach of the notice requirments of the policy
and (B) the rights of an innocent third party might be affected by the avoidance. 16 In resolving the issue, the court
held,
We think the sound rule to be that, in an action affecting the rights
of innocent third parties under an automobile liability insurance policy,
the noncompliance by the insured with policy provisions as to notice
and forwarding of suit papers will not bar recovery, unless the insurer
shows that the failure to give such notice has resulted in substantial
7
prejudice to its rights.'

II.
A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE

PriorCase Law

Prior cases decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
though not directed to the specific question resolved in Factory
Mutual v. Kennedy, contain considerable discussion of the nostantial conjecture on the probable conduct of the parties raises the question
in the first instance, but does feel this alternative remains to be explored by
our court.
14. Record at 87.
15. One earlier case, Squires v. Nat'l. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58,
145 S.E.2d 673 (1965) mentioned prejudice in the context of the notice clause,
but seems to have turned on the Court's interpretation of the phrase "as soon
as practicable." Id. at 67-68, 145 S.E.2d at 678.
16. One may question whether, in a strict sense, the rights of an innocent
third party were at stake in Factory Mut. v. Kennedy. The Barkoots had uninsured motorists coverage with Fireman's Fund which must, according to S.C.
CoDa ANN. §46-750.14 (1962), provide limits of recovery identical (with the
exception of a $200.00 property damage deductible) to that required of an assigned risk policy by S.C. CODE ANN. §46-750.13 (1962). Mr. Kennedy was
allegedly insured under the assigned risk plan by Factory Mutual.
Consequently, the Barkoots had a maximum potential recovery under either
policy of $20,000.00 for bodily injury. The balance of the judgment would have
been the individual obligation of defendant Kennedy. It might also be noted
that the appellant was Fireman's Fund. See note 13, supra.
17. 256 S.C. 376, 381, 182 S.E.2d 727, 729-30.
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tice requirements in various type policies. Other cases, usually
dealing with the cooperation clause in automobile liability
policies, have discussed the rights and duties of the primary
parties to the contract, as well as those of interested third
parties. From a composite of these cases it is not at all surprising that the Federal District Court of South Carolina
would find that, "It is unnecessary to determine whether the
insurers were prejudiced by the delay since the question of
prejudice has been held immaterial in such cases."'I s
The case law which led the District Court to this decision,
along with other cases could best be said to have begun with
Free v. United Life & Accident Insurance Co.,19 and Lee v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 20 In each of these cases a

policyholder was denied certain first party benefits as a result
of an alleged breach of notice conditions contained in the policies. 20 , In Lee the court, citing Free, stated,
No rule of law is more firmly established in this jurisdiction than that
one suing on a policy of insurance, where notice required by the policy
is not timely given, cannot recover. And the Court has gone so far as
to hold that the failure to give the required notice in the alloted time
is fatal to the right of recovery, even if it be shown that the insur21
ance company has suffered no harm by the delay.

In the later cases of Boyle Road & Bridge Co. v.American
Employers' Insurance Co.2 2 and Hatchett v. Nationwide Mu-

tual Insurance Co. 2. the court seemed to reinforce the rule
24
stated in Free and Lee.

18. Bruce v. U.S.F&G. Co., 277 F. Supp. 439, 445 (D.S.C. 1967).
19. 178 S.C. 317, 182 S.E. 754 (1935).
20. 180 S.C. 475, 186 S.E. 376 (1936).
20a. The use of the term "first party" refers to the insured; "second
party," the insurer; and, "third party", any claimant not a party to the insurance contract.
21. Id. at 486, 186 S.E. at 381.
22. 195 S.C. 397, 11 S.E.2d 438 (1940).
23. 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964).
24. Both of these actions were, again, first party actions. In Boyle the
court refused to pass the burden of a default judgment on an employer's liability
loss to the insurer when it found the neglect of Boyle in failing to notify its
insurer led .to the default. In Hatchett the court again refused to require payment by the insurer in a default situation on an uninsured motorist policy when
the case was irretrievably in default prior to the forwarding of notice to the

insurer. However, in neither case did the court indicate dissatisfaction with
Free and Lee, nor did it specifically state the rule on notice was being modi-

fied.
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These cases coupled with the court's position on third
party rights under an insurance contract would have allowed
some to conclude that the notice condition must be complied
with precedent to any recovery from the insurer by any in25
terested party, irrespective of prejudice to the insurer.
The court was, however, developing a line of authority in
another closely related area which was to have a decisive effect on the Kennedy situation. In Phwrr v. Canal Insurance
Co.,20 among other questions, the court was confronted with
an alleged breach of both the notice and cooperation conditions
of an automobile liability policy. In that case Canal's policyholder never gave notice of the accident or suit to Canal and
failed or refused to meet with Canal's attorneys, who were attempting to defend the action. The only notice received by
Canal was from the attorneys for Pharr. In reversing a directed verdict in favor of Canal, the court held, inter alia, a
jury question was presented on whether the alleged breach of
the cooperation clause had, in fact, taken place and ".. .whether such failure to cooperate has operated to the substantial
prejudice of the insurer....,,27
On the question the court stated:
The attorneys for the respondents sent copies of the suit papers, in each
of the cases, to the adjuster, who forwarded them to the appellant
In the case of Royal Itdemnotity Co. v. Morris, 9 Cir., 37 F. (2d) 90, it
25. In Crook v. State Farm Mitt. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 460, 112 S.E.2d
241, 245 (1960), the court said,
"[Tihe injured person has no greater right under the liability
policy than has the insured. . . . The present action is one
plainly upon contract. It is, therefore, subject to any proper defense by the Insurance Company under the terms of its contract.
The issue between the parties here is the same as it would be
had the assured brought the action. Crook v. State Farm Mitt.
Ins. Co., 231 S.C. 257, 98 S.E.2d 431."
And, in Park v. Safeco Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 410, 413, 162 S.E2d 709, 710 (1968),
the court stated, "An injured person has no greater right against an insurer
under a liability insurance policy than the insured."
26. 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958).
27. Id. at 282, 104 S.E.2d at 402. In stating that the insurer must show it
was "substantially prejudiced" by the insured's failure to cooperate, the court
cited, with approval, Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Vijet, 148 Fla. 568, 4 So.2d 862
(1941). Interestingly, Florida also requires prejudice to the insurer as a condition of forfeiture, but presumes prejudice from delayed notice and places the
burden on the proponent of the policy. See, Niesz v. Albright, 217 So.2d 606
(Fla. App. 1969); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Tiedtke, 207 So.2d 40 (Fla. App.

1968).
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was held that the failure of the insured to forward copies of the summons and complaint to the insurer was no defense to recovery on the
policy where the insurer was given timely notice by the mailing to it
of a copy of the summons and complaint by the Plaintiff in the ac28
tion.

The holding in Pharrwas followed by the court in the later
cases of Crook v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co.29 and Squires v.
National Grange Mutual Ins. Co.3° In Crook the court merely
reaffirmed the rule as stated in Pharrin relation to the insurer's burden when asserting a forfeiture by virtue of an
alleged breach of the cooperation clause. In Squires, we find
the first indications that the court might be amenable to the
expansion of the Pharrrule to cover other conditions in an automobile liability policy. The court was squarely faced with a
contention by an uninsured motorist carrier that its policyholder had breached the conditions requiring Proof of Claim
as soon as practicable and in not providing proper notice of a
legal action. In considering the issues the court stated:
It is well settled that, unless waived by the insurer, the failure of an
insured to comply with policy provisions as to notice or forwarding
suit papers, which are by the terms of the contract made conditions
precedent to liability, will bar recovery. Hatchett v. Nationwide lutual
Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E. (2d) 608. The burden of proof is upon
the insurer to show not only that the insured has failed to perform the
terms and conditions invoked upon him by the policy contract but in
addition that it was substantially prejudiced thereby. Plarr v. Canal
Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.(2d) 394, and Crook v. State Farm
31
Mutual Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.(2d) 241.

However, the court did not find it necessary to rely on Pharr

28. Id. at 279-80, 104 S.E.2d at 401. Since the case appears to have turnea
on the cooperation issue, this statement could well be considered as dictum.
However, even though the court made no further comment on the notice issue, the Ninth Circuit decision was cited with apparent approval implying that
the insured may be totally relieved of the responsibility of providing notice if
the plaintiff provides timely notice.
29. 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241 (1960).
30. 247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673 (1965).
31. Id. at 67, 145 S.E.2d at 677. It should be noted that the first quoted
paragraph is directly quoted from Hatchett (244 S.C. at 250, 137 S.E.2d at 613)
while the second quoted paragraph appears to substantially broaden the actual
statement in Pharr (233 S.C. at 278-79, 104 S.E.2d at 667) by deleting any
reference to the cooperation clause which was at issue in the Pharr case.
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or Hatchett in reaching its decision. Relying on other cases, 32

the court found that the policyholder had given notice of the
claim "as soon as practicable" making any consideration of
prejudice to the insurer moot. Hatchett, it was decided, did
not control the result in Squires due to clearly distinguishing
factual considerations. 33 The rule requiring substantial prejudice, nevertheless, was stated and was subsequently relied
34
on in Kennedy.
B.

Public Policy Considerations
An attempt to characterize Kennedy as a misconstruction

of precedent or as an unfounded departure from accepted doctrine would be begging the question. The statement of the
"new rule" in this case was, more importantly, the end result

of the court's considered recognition of a pressing public interest in protecting innocent victims of automobile accidents
from economic loss. 3 5 Those who would criticize the court's
posture after Kennedy might say the court has, "under the
guise of public policy", 30 changed the terms of the agreement.
But, has it? May not, and should not, the court look beyond

the technical terms of the policy and, where reasonable, effectuate its basic purpose? As the Federal District Court for
South Carolina stated, "In construction of insurance contracts,
courts should not ignore the fact that the primary object of all
insurance is to insure. ....,,37
For many years the courts have recognized that the insurance contract is of a separate breed which should be con32. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jahrling, 16 A.D.2d 501, 229 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1962);
Brown v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 24 Misc.2d 550, 206 N.Y.S.2d
294 (1960); North River Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 244 S.C. 393, 137 S.E.2d 264
(1964); Brown v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 376, 104 S.E.2d 673
(1958).
33. 247 S.C. at 70, 145 S.E.2d at 679.
34. 256 S.C. at 381, 182 S.E.2d at 730. Or, considering the statements in
Squires as obitcr dicta, one may correctly say the "rule" was first stated for
value as precedent in Kennedy.
35. Id. at 380, 182 S.E.2d at 729. The consideration of the importance of the
public policy issue cannot be properly diminished by the fact that the Barkoots
only stood to lose a maximum of $200.00 in this case, as discussed in note 16
supra, had the judgment of the lower court been affirmed. Nor does the fact
that the "innocent victim" did not appeal diminish the importance of the court's
decision.
36. Stanky v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 533, 538, 121 S.E.2d 10, 13 (1961).
Also cited in note 6, supra.
37. Heffron v. Jersey Ins. Co., 144 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.S.C. 1956).
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strued favorably toward the policyholder, not the result of
arms-length bargaining by parties possessed of equal power. 38
With this rule of construction firmly embedded in our law, it
should not seem inconsistent that other public policy areas
would be considered. In the early case of Ott v. American
Fidelity & Casualty Co.,30 the court applied legislation requiring public passenger carriers to purchase and maintain public
liability insurance.40 In giving effect to the acknowledged legislative purpose, the court said,
It appears to us that to allow the insured's failure to give notice of
the accident to prevent the injured person's recovery would be to pratically nullify the statute by making the enforcement of the rights of
the person intended to be protected dependent upon the acts of the
very person who caused the injury.4 1

In another case area the court again has pointed out that a
breach of policy conditions would not be allowed to defeat recovery by the injured party if the policyholder was insured
under a "certified" policy because of a specific legislative man-

date. 42

One of the first clear statements of public policy in the
absence of a direct legislative act in the general area of in43
surance appeared in Evans v. American Home Assurance Co.
The case dealt with an insured who failed to appear for trial of
a civil action and the company's resulting refusal to pay a
judgment. The company's position was based on an alleged

violation of the cooperation condition in the policy. Though
the court reached its decision on the basis of earlier holdings
in Pharrand Crook, the public policy rationale first stated in
38. See, e.g., Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 214 F.2d 523 (4th
Cir. 1954); S.S. Newell & Co. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 199 S.C. 325, 19
S.E.2d 463 (1942). Admittedly the courts have generally required that some
ambiguity exist which would lend itself to an interpretation in favor of a
policyholder. However, most close observers of the broad range of cases in this
area would agree that ambiguities have been found in unsuspected areas, and
that public policy has been the driving force behind many decisions, whether
specifically identified as such, or not.
39. 161 S.C. 314, 159 S.E. 635 (1931).
40. Cited as 34 Stat. at Large, p. 255, §5 (1925).
41. 161 S.C. at 319, 159 S.E. at 637.
42. Though clearly dictum, the Court cited S.C. CoDE AxN. §46-707(7) (b)
(Supp. 1970) as an expression of public policy in Evas v. Am. Home Assur.
Co., 252 S.C. 417, 166 S.E.2d 811 (1969).
43. Id. at 420, 166 S.E.2d at 812.
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Evans was to reappear as an important part of Kennedy.44 It

is here we find reference to the "innocent victim" and "protection" as operative points in the decision making process. We
see the court moving toward considerations outside the language of the contract in giving effect to the public purpose of
insurance rather than the private purpose of the parties to the

contract itself.45

CONCLUSIONS

The result in Kennedy places South Carolina in a minority

position with respect to the requirement of prejudice to the
carrier prior to a forfeiture of benefits by the third party. At
least twelve other jurisdictions are squarely in line with not
only the new South Carolina rule, but with the policy rationale
used in reaching it. 46 At least one state presumes prejudice
and, thereby shifts the burden of proof to the person claiming
the benefits of the policy, 47 while a majority of the jurisdic-

tions find prejudice immaterial in their deliberations. 48
It should be recalled that Kennedy purports to deal with

only the rights of innocent third parties who have been injured
by the policyholder. There is no reason to assume the holdings
in Free and Lee have been disturbed as they apply to first

party losses. In view of this an unresolved question may remain in the area of uninsured motorists coverage. 49 In the
44. 256 S.C. at 381, 182 S.E.2d at 729.
45. To discuss the appropriateness of resting decisions on public policy or
purpose is, this writer feels, outside the scope of this article. The principle is
so well grounded in our system of jurisprudence little could be added to the
many prior publications in this area.
46. Miller v. Lindgate Developers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Mo. 1967);
Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311 (1968); Campbell v.
Allstate Ins., Co., 60 Cal. 2d 303, 384 P.2d 155, 32 Cal. Reptr. 827 (1963);
Weller v. Cummins, 330 Mich. 286, 47 N.W.2d 612 (1951); Cooper v. Gov't
Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) ; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 116 Ohio App. 22, 186 N.E.2d 208 (1961) ; Fox v.
Nat'l Savings Ins. Co., 424 P.2d 19 (Okla. 1967) ; Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Gentry, 202 Va. 338, 117 S.E.2d 76 (1960); cf. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 139 Ind. App. 622, 218 N.E.2d 712 (1966) (Cooperation clause); but
cf. U.S.F.&G. Co. v. Gable, 125 Vt. 519, 220 A.2d 165 (1966).
47. See, Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Tiedtke, 207 So.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1968).
48. Annot. 18 A.L.R. 2d. 443 (1951).
49. This coverage is decidedly "first party" by virtue of the contract.
Squires, as indicated above, implied the court would look to the question of
prejudice, but did not so hold.
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463

instances of collision losses, accident and health claims, disability claims, fire or homeowner losses and life insurance
claims, the rationale of Free and Lee would still appear to control, thus requiring strict compliance with the notice conditions of the various policies as a condition precedent to recovery.
D. A. BROWN
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